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Abstract
We posit that parties assess bargaining outcomes not in absolute
terms but in relative terms vis ￿ a vis reference points and we assume
that reference points are a￿ected by prior o￿ers. In a simple bargaining
model, we illustrate how such evolving preferences may be responsible
for gradualism and delay in bargaining. We observe that the resulting
ine￿ciency may not vanish even in the limit as the cost of waiting for
one more period gets very small.
1 Introduction
Many factors in￿uence the positions people take when negotiating. To pro-
ceed, both sides must adjust their positions throughout the negotiation, ul-
timately arriving at either agreement or impasse. Most observed bargaining
patterns typically involve gradual adjustments of positions.
In this paper we take the view that agents assess ￿nal agreements not
in absolute terms but in relative terms vis a vis some reference point. That
is, any agreement above the reference point is valued as a gain (possibly
discounted by when the agreement is reached) and any agreement below
the reference point is valued as a loss (see Khaneman and Tversky (1979)).
We also take the view that in bargaining contexts the reference point is
￿Compte: PSE, e-mail, compte@enpc.fr ; Jehiel: PSE and University College (London),
e-mail, jehiel@enpc.fr
1a￿ected by prior o￿ers (see Bazerman and Neale (1992, p 24) for a support
of this view). Speci￿cally, we assume that a larger prior o￿er obtained
in a previous bargaining phase results in a higher reference point for the
current bargaining phase. To ￿x ideas we let the reference point used by a
party coincide with the most generous o￿er received by this party in previous
bargaining phases. Within a bargaining phase reference points do not adjust,
but as one keeps bargaining there is always a risk that the current bargaining
phases stops in which case one moves to a new bargaining phase, reference
points adjust and parties incur a small cost c.1
Our main interest lies in understanding the bargaining dynamics with
reference points evolving as just described. We adopt an equilibrium ap-
proach. That is, we assume that at any point in time parties understand
the pattern of o￿ers that will come next as a function of their own cur-
rent move (and the history of o￿ers). These patterns of moves are then
assessed according to the preference that derives from the reference point
that prevails in the current bargaining phase, and parties choose optimal
moves given their criterion.
Our main result is that in an otherwise standard model, evolving refer-
ence points may induce gradualism in bargaining. Our paper thus shows the
link between reference-dependent preferences and gradualism in bargaining,
two well established features whose connection has not been noted (as far
as we know).
Our result should be contrasted with the literature on bargaining with
complete information and standard non-evolving preferences (Rubinstein
(1982)). There, an agreement is reached immediately and thus no gradual
pattern can arise. The reason for the immediate agreement result in Rubin-
stein’s model is related to the so called Coase Theorem. If some ine￿ciency
were to arise, then the proposer could o￿er an immediate agreement, thereby
1Our modeling is consistent with the view that reference points adjust only occasionally
when a salient event (like a change of bargaining phase) occurs.
2keeping the lost surplus for himself.2
The intuition as to why the immediate agreement result does not hold
with evolving reference-dependent preferences is as follows. Suppose the
negotiation is about the partition of a pie of size 1 between two parties A
and B, and suppose by contradiction that there is immediate agreement at
(1=2;1=2). If party A starts the negotiation, she should o￿er right away
(1=2;1=2) to party B, and party B should accept.
But, party B has a better option. By not making any o￿er, party B
would eventually trigger a switch to a new bargaining phase. This would
have a cost. However, negotiation would start on new grounds, with party
B’s reference point now being equal to 1=2 and party A’s reference point
remaining equal to 0 (remember that B has not made any o￿er yet). With
such reference points, B would end up with a larger share of the pie,3 and,
from the viewpoint of the original bargaining phase, this larger share would
plainly justify for B the cost of moving to another phase (if this cost is
assumed small).
The failure of the Coase Theorem has already been noted in other
frameworks with reference-dependent preferences. In particular, Kahneman,
Knetch and Thaler (1990) report evidence on the fact that willingness to ac-
cept may exceed willingness to pay in simple transaction economies, thereby
suggesting that the level of transactions may be ine￿ciently low (from an
orthodox viewpoint). Such pathologies are referred to as the endowment
e￿ect and they are generally explained by the fact that one’s preferences
depend on one own’s allocation (one gets attached to goods one possesses).
The endowment e￿ect clearly involves a form of reference-dependence (the
reference being the endowment). Here, the reference-dependence is of a
di￿erent nature: prior o￿ers rather than endowments a￿ect the reference
2This argument shows that there exist equilibria with immediate agreement. It does
not prove though that there are no other equilibria (which Rubinstein (1982) shows).
3That is, assuming some symmetry in the subgame, a share equal to 3=4.
3point.4 Moreover, in our case, the departure from the Coase Theorem takes
the form of delay in reaching agreements, which has no counterpart in the
literature on the endowment e￿ect.
This paper is not the ￿rst to develop a theoretical model with reference-
dependent preferences. Compared to prospect theory (Khaneman and Tver-
sky (1979)), our model makes no assumption as to whether agents are more
sensitive to gains or losses, and it applies whatever the attitude towards gains
versus losses. From this perspective, the focus of our work is more on the
dynamics of reference points and how it a￿ects the bargaining tactics.5 In
recent work, K￿ oszegi and Rabin (2006) have proposed a model to endogenize
the reference point by the expectations made in equilibrium (see also Shalev
(2000)). In our approach, reference points are determined by the positions
adopted by the parties in prior bargaining phases. Since these positions are
endogenously determined, one might argue that the dynamics of reference
points is endogenous in our model. Yet, the function specifying how the ref-
erence point depends on past positions is exogenous in our approach, which
is di￿erent in spirit from the formulation of K￿ oszegi and Rabin. It should
be noted that if reference points were determined by the expected utility
anticipated by agents in equilibrium then one equilibrium would result in
immediate agreement as in Rubinstein (1982)’s original theory.6 Thus, some
dependence of the reference point on history rather than on expectations
4Nevertheless, one could argue that both e￿ects have similar psychological foundations,
with the view that prior o￿ers are often taken for granted, and that one becomes attached
to the plans one builds based upon these prior concessions.
5Previous works on evolving reference points considered non-strategic interactions, see
Gilboa Smeidler (2001), and Strahilevitz-Loewenstein (1998) who study consumption mod-
els with changing reference points based on the ideas of evolving aspiration levels and the
endowment e￿ect, respectively.
6The reason is that as in Rubinstein’s equilibrium, equilibrium utility would be in-
dependent of history and thus there would be no e￿ect of prior o￿ers on expectations
and thus no e￿ect on the ensuing subgame equilibrium. Stationarity would be preserved,
resulting in immediate agreement.
4seems to be required to explain gradualism in our bargaining model.
>From an applied perspective, our analysis may be viewed as formalizing
the commonly accepted idea that it may be risky to start o￿ negotiations
with generous o￿ers. The risk is that, through the possible change of ref-
erence point, a generous o￿er will be taken for granted in the future, and
eventually whet one’s opponent appetite. The Camp David negotiations, as
accounted for by President Carter (as reported in Kissinger (1979, p 392),
o￿er a good illustration of this view (through the advice given to President
Sadat):
His (Sadat) own advisers had pointed out the danger in his
signing an agreement with the United States alone. Later, if
direct discussions were ever resumed with the Israelis, they could
say: "The Egyptians have already agreed to all these points.
Now we will use what they have signed as the original basis [our
reference point] for all future negotiations".
>From a theory perspective, our result provides an explanation for delay
and gradualism in bargaining based on the adjustment of reference points.
It di￿ers from other explanations of delay that rely on some form of in-
complete information (see Kennan and Wilson (1993)). It also di￿ers from
explanations of gradualism based on the presence of outside options that
would depend on the history of o￿ers (Compte and Jehiel (2004)).
Our ￿nding however has close connections with the explanation based on
history-dependent outside options. Even though there is no explicit outside
option in our setup, the tactic of waiting for the arrival of a new bargaining
phase (so that reference points adjust) plays a role very similar to that of an
outside option. An important di￿erence though is that in Compte and Jehiel
(2004), the payo￿ derived from the outside option is exogenously speci￿ed as
a function of the history of o￿ers; whereas in our setup, the ’outside option’
payo￿ is derived endogenously. In particular, the endogenous character of
5this payo￿ allows us to obtain that the ine￿ciency induced by the delay
may be bounded away from 0 even as the bargaining friction (i.e. the cost
of switching to a new bargaining phase) gets very small.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section
3 presents the main insight. Section 4 deals with the equilibrium construc-
tion. Concluding remarks appear in Section 5.
2 The model
We consider a bargaining game described as follows. There are two parties
i = 1;2 who negotiate over the partition of a pie of size 1. The game
consists of possibly several bargaining phases n = 1;2::: taking place over
dates t = 1;2::: The start of the interaction corresponds to date t = 1, and
bargaining phase 1. At the start of a new bargaining phase, say at date
t, one of the parties is drawn at random with probability 1/2 to make an
o￿er to the other party. The responder may then accept or reject the o￿er.
If he accepts, this is the end of the bargaining and the partition o￿er is
implemented. Otherwise, the game moves to the next date t + 1.
As long as one stays within a bargaining phase, parties move in alternate
order; so if party i made the o￿er at t, party j makes the o￿er at t+1. At the
end of each date, there is an exogenous probability ￿ of breakdown. In case
of breakdown, a new bargaining phase starts. Moving from one bargaining
phase to the next one is assumed to cost c to each party.
The key ingredients of this paper are that (i) preferences are de￿ned
relative to reference points and that (ii) reference points move from one
phase to another.
Preferences: In any given phase, the utility that player j derives from the
partition o￿er y = (yi;yj) when his current reference point is rj is de￿ned
by
vj(y;rj) = yj ￿ rj.
6Thus, only o￿ers in excess of the reference point are valued positively. O￿ers
below the reference point would be counted as a loss if accepted.7 One
possible interpretation of the reference point rj is that it corresponds to the
minimum aspiration level of the player, that is, a level of o￿er at which the
utility he derives is zero.8
Let us now specify how players assess in any phase an agreement to take
place in a later phase. We assume that the assessments are made relative
to the reference point prevailing in the current phase.
That is, consider bargaining phase n and assume player j’s reference
point is equal to rj in that phase. Player j assesses an agreement on y =
(yi;yj) that would take place in phase n0 ￿ n according to un
j (y;r;n0) where:
un
j (y;rj;n0) = vj(y;rj) ￿ (n0 ￿ n)c:
In particular, viewed from phase n, the maximum surplus that players can
derive from agreement is equal to K = 1 ￿ ri ￿ rj.
Shifting reference points: We assume that reference points vary from one
bargaining phase to another according to how generous the current o￿ers
are, given the current reference point. Formally, let X
(n)
j denote the largest
o￿er received by party j during phase n. The di￿erence X
(n)
j ￿ r
(n)
j is a
measure of the generosity of the o￿ers received by player j in phase n. We
assume that
r
(n+1)
j ￿ r
(n)
j = maxfX
(n)
j ￿ r
(n)
j ;0g: (1)
7In prospect theory, one issue is how losses are counted compared to gains, that is,
whether the slope of the utility function is the same for gains and losses. For our purpose,
the slope is unimportant. It only matters that o￿ers below the reference point are viewed
as a loss (compared to the scenario in which no agreement is ever reached and one stays
in the same bargaining phase for ever).
8See Yukl (1974) and White and Neale (1994) for experiments concerning the e￿ect of
o￿ers on aspiration levels, and the e￿ect of aspirations on negotiation outcomes.
7That is, as long as o￿ers to player j in stage n remained below the reference
point r
(n)
j , player j’s reference point may not rise. An equivalent formulation
of equality (1), which we will use in the analysis, is that at any date, a
player’s reference point coincides with the most generous o￿er he received
in the previous phases. That is, Xt
j denotes the most generous o￿er received
up to date t in phase n. If breakdown occurred after date t o￿er was rejected,
then
r
(n+1)
j ￿ r
(n)
i = Xt
j ￿ r
(n)
i .
Strategies and equilibrium: For each player i, a strategy in this game
speci￿es an o￿er yt
j at each date t, as a function of the history of the game
(which consists of the previous o￿ers, the dates at which breakdown occurred
(if any), the identity of the player drawn to start making an o￿er after each
breakdown).
We assume that at any point in time parties understand the pattern
of o￿ers that will come next as a function of their own current move (and
the history of o￿ers), and that parties choose the best move(s) given their
current preferences and expectations about the following moves. From a
technical viewpoint, we are considering the subgame perfect equilibria of
the game in which party i in bargaining phase n is viewed as a di￿erent
player from party i in bargaining phase n0. We refer to such equilibria as
subgame perfect equilibria.
Our main purpose in the next Section will be to convey some intuition
as to why shifting reference points lead to gradualism. We shall delay the
explicit construction of a subgame perfect equilibrium involving ine￿cient
delay to Section 4.
It should be noted that if the reference points were set at 0 in this
model (as is assumed in virtually all formal models of bargaining) then in a
symmetric (Markovian) equilibrium the proposer would o￿er 1
2￿
￿c
2￿￿ keeping
the rest for herself so that the responder is indi￿erent between accepting and
8rejecting the deal.9
Comment: We have chosen not to introduce time discounting in the
payo￿ speci￿cation. This is mostly to simplify the construction of the equi-
librium in Section 4.10
3 Main insights
This section explains why shifting reference points lead to gradualism. It
also provides some intuition on the size of the steps that players make in
equilibrium.
Consider the ￿rst phase of bargaining and a date t. Suppose that bar-
gaining breaks down right after date t￿o￿er has been rejected thus inducing
a switch to a second bargaining phase. The most generous o￿er received in
this phase by player i = 1;2 is Xt
i. In such a scenario, the phase 2 reference
points would be given by
ri = Xt
i (2)
In this second phase, given the change in preferences, an o￿er (y1;y2) is
valued at yi ￿ ri by player i. So it is as if players were now bargaining over
a pie of size K with
K = 1 ￿ r1 ￿ r2 (3)
where a partition (y1;y2) in the original game corresponds to (y1￿r1;y2￿r2)
in the new bargaining game.
In the symmetric setting that we consider, this surplus K will end up
being shared equally between the two players in expectation. That is, each
9 1
2 ￿
￿c
2￿￿ = ￿(
1
2 ￿ c) + (1 ￿ ￿)(
1
2 +
￿c
2￿￿)
10It should be noted that in the absence of time discounting the game with reference
points set at 0 admits other equilibria beyond the stationary one described above.
9party i will end up with a share yi of the original pie such that
yi ￿ ri =
K
2
(4)
Of course, several periods and thus several bargaining phases may be
required before the agreement is reached. For the sake of illustration, we
assume that the expected number of breakdowns depends solely on the size
of K and we denote this expected number by ￿(K); we further assume that
￿(￿) is non-decreasing in K (this will be the case for the equilibrium analyzed
in Section 4).
It follows from (4) and the de￿nition of ￿(:) that from the viewpoint of
phase 1, player i’s expected payo￿ is equal to11
ri +
K
2
￿ (1 + ￿(K))c
or, equivalently,
1
2
+
Xt
i ￿ Xt
j
2
￿ (1 + ￿(K))c (5)
The interpretation of (5) is as follows. The di￿erence Xt
i ￿Xt
j represents
how generous the o￿ers made by player j were in phase 1 relative to those
made by i. When this di￿erence is positive, party i is in a favorable position
in case the negotiation moves to a second phase. This is precisely why
making a generous o￿er is a risky strategy. Suppose player i makes a
generous o￿er, player j may next refrain from making any relevant o￿er.
This would force a breakdown at some point. Player j’s reference point would
then increase, and this would hurt player i. As a result, the negotiation
process has to be gradual.
It should be noted that while the analysis above applies to the ￿rst
phase, it readily extends to any later phase. Indeed, consider phase n, with
reference points r
(n)
1 and r
(n)
2 . Let Kn = 1 ￿ r
(n)
1 ￿ r
(n)
2 . Assume that the
11The cost is c when moving to phase 2 and ￿(K)c in expectation thereafter.
10most generous o￿er received by player i = 1;2 is Xt
i, and that the bargaining
process breaks down after date t o￿er is rejected, thus inducing a switch to
phase n + 1. Equation (4) becomes yi ￿ r
(n+1)
i = Kn+1
2 , with r
(n+1)
i = Xt
i.
De￿ning xt
i as the increment over the reference point, that is,
xt
i ￿ Xt
i ￿ rn
i ;
we get, from the viewpoint of phase n, that player i’s expected payo￿ is
equal to
Kn
2
+
xt
i ￿ xt
j
2
￿ (1 + ￿(Kn+1))c
As in phase 1, the di￿erence xt
i ￿ xt
j represents how generous the o￿ers (in
excess of the current reference points) made by player j were relative to
those made by i (in phase n).
How gradual does the process has to be?
The above observations are suggestive that the negotiation process must
be gradual, but how gradual should it be? To address that issue, we derive
an upper bound on how much parties are ready to improve their o￿er in
each round.
Speci￿cally, consider a date t in phase 1. We assume that in equilibrium,
player i increases the generosity of his o￿er by an amount of ￿. We compare
the payo￿ that player i would obtain by waiting till the process moves to the
next phase, with the payo￿ he would obtain at most if he were to increase
the generosity of his o￿er by an amount of ￿. We let ￿t = Xt
i ￿Xt
j denote
the di￿erence between player i and player j’s most generous o￿ers received
up to date t, and Kt = 1￿Xt
1 ￿Xt
2. By refraining from making any better
o￿er (until breakdown arises), player i would obtain at least:12
vi ￿
1 + ￿t
2
￿ (1 + ￿(Kt))c (6)
12Possibly, party j could make a more generous o￿er before breakdown arises, but this
could only increase further the payo￿ party i obtains once breakdown arises.
11If player i instead increases by ￿ the generosity of his o￿er, player j may
secure (again by waiting for a breakdown) a payo￿ equal to
vj ￿
1 ￿ ￿t + ￿
2
￿ (1 + ￿(Kt ￿ ￿))c: (7)
Since players cannot hope to get more than 1 in total, we must have
v1 + v2 ￿ 1: (8)
In equilibrium, only o￿ers for which ￿ satis￿es the above inequalities can
be made. Since ￿(￿) is assumed to be non-decreasing, we infer by adding
(6)-(7)-(8) and rearranging:
￿ ￿ 4(1 + ￿(Kt))c (9)
Inequality (9) thus provides an upper bound on the extra generosity of a
new o￿er made in equilibrium in phase 1. Clearly, the same logic applies to
any later phase, so
￿ = 4(1 + ￿(1))c (10)
provides a uniform upper bound on the steps that players make throughout
the game. In particular, it implies that when c is small the expected number
of phases cannot be small: if it were, then the steps would be small by (10),
hence the expected number of rounds necessary to reach agreement would
be large (that is, at least equal to 1=￿), and so would be the expected
number of breakdowns (￿ times the number of rounds necessary to reach
agreement).
More formally, this argument shows that ￿ ￿ ￿￿ where13 ￿￿ = 4(1 +
￿
￿￿)c. This implies for small c:
￿ . 2(￿c)1=2: (11)
13￿ > d ) ￿(1) <
￿
d ) ￿ < 4(1 +
￿
d)c (by (10)), which is obviously absurd when
d > 4(1 +
￿
d)c.
12It would seem from (11) that ine￿ciencies might be small as the cost c of
moving to a new bargaining phase gets small (since
￿
(￿c)1=2￿c = (￿c)1=2 !
c!0
0).
However, (11) only provides a very crude bound on the steps that players
make in equilibrium. As in Compte and Jehiel (2004), two forces are at
work to determine the bound on ￿: (i) the extent to which a generous
o￿er bene￿ts the other party in case of breakdown, and (ii) the e￿ciency
loss associated with breakdown, as compared to following the equilibrium
course of o￿ers and counter-o￿ers. Since the expected number of breakdowns
cannot be small when c is small, following the equilibrium course of o￿ers
and counter-o￿ers is also ine￿cient, and therefore inequality (8) can be
re￿ned.
Assuming that constant steps of size ￿ are made throughout the game
in equilibrium (this will turn out to be a feature of the equilibrium displayed
in Section 4), we must have:
v1 + v2 ￿ 1 ￿ 2￿c ￿ 2c￿(Kt ￿ ￿) (12)
To see this, observe that after a further step of size ￿ there is a probability
￿ of breakdown resulting in an extra e￿ciency loss 2￿c; and whether or not
there is breakdown, the expected number of new bargaining phases after this
extra step is ￿(Kt￿￿) resulting in an expected e￿ciency loss of 2c￿(Kt￿￿)
(we use here the feature that the same step ￿ is made whether or not there
is breakdown). By adding up (6), (7) and (12), we obtain a re￿nement of
(9) as follows:
￿ ￿ 2(1 + ￿(Kt))c + 2(1 + ￿(Kt ￿ ￿))c ￿ 4￿c ￿ 4c￿(Kt ￿ ￿)
￿ 4c(1 ￿ ￿) + 2c(￿(Kt) ￿ ￿(Kt ￿ ￿)):
Since ￿(Kt) = ￿ + ￿(Kt ￿ ￿) (this is obtained using again our assumption
that in equilibrium, a step of size ￿ is made at Kt), we ￿nally get:
￿ ￿ 2c(2 ￿ ￿)
13which implies that steps have a size comparable to the cost of breakdown.
In particular, this implies a number of rounds approximately equal to
1
2c(2￿￿), which corresponds to an expected number of breakdowns equal to
￿
2c(2￿￿), thus an e￿ciency loss approximately equal to ￿=(2 ￿ ￿). We note
that the e￿ciency loss is positive for any ￿xed ￿, even at the limit when c
gets arbitrarily small.
4 Equilibrium Construction
The main objective of this Section is to construct an equilibrium, and con-
￿rm for this equilibrium the insights developed in Section 3. The equilibrium
we will construct has the feature that o￿ers are gradually improved so as
to make the responder indi￿erent between moving further or waiting for a
breakdown (with no further move meanwhile). So inequalities (6) and (7)
are tight. Besides, in this equilibrium, it will be the case that the size of
o￿er increment remains unchanged throughout the game. Thus, the insight
at the end of Section 3 applies, and the equilibrium is such that ine￿ciencies
arise even at the limit as c is very small.
Speci￿cally, we let ￿ = ￿c=(1 ￿ ￿=2). We de￿ne the sequence
z(0) = ￿;z(1) = 2c + 2￿ and for all k ￿ 1, z(m+1) = z(m) + 2c(2 ￿ ￿):
Next, we let k be the largest integer such that z(k) < 1, and let z(k+1) = 1.
So when c is small, k is approximately equal to 1
2c(2￿￿), which will be the
number of rounds required to reach agreement.
We construct an equilibrium where (i) the distance between most gen-
erous o￿ers gradually reduces from 1 to z(k) to z(k￿1), and so on until z(1),
and where (ii) in each phase, players take turn in increasing the generosity
of their o￿ers.
We de￿ne a candidate strategy pro￿le ￿ as follows. Consider any date
t. As before, we let Xt
1 and Xt
2 denote the most generous o￿ers received by
14players 1 and 2 up to date t, and let Xt ￿ 1￿Xt
1 ￿Xt
2. Assume it is player
i’s turn to move.
We start by describing strategies in the event Xt > z(0). We let z(m)
denote the threshold satisfying
z(m) < Xt ￿ z(m+1):
According to ￿, player i makes one of the following two moves (we will
shortly de￿ne which one he makes, as a function of the history of the game):
either he leaves his o￿er unchanged
(yt
i;yt
j) = (1 ￿ Xt
j;Xt
j);
or he increases his o￿er to player j by an amount Xt￿z(m), thereby ensuring
that Xt+1 = z(m) if his o￿er is rejected. That is,
(yt
i;yt
j) = (Xt
i + z(m);Xt
j + Xt ￿ z(m)):
Next, player j rejects all o￿ers, except those that would lead to some Xt+1 ￿
z(0).
We now specify the rules that determines whether the player who moves,
say player i, is supposed to increase his o￿er (st = 1) or not (st = 0):
(a) If this is the start of a new phase or if z(m) < Xt < z(m) + d, with
d = (1 ￿ ￿)2c + ￿, then player i is supposed to increase his o￿er (st = 1).
(b) If (a) does not apply and Xt￿1 > z(m+1), player i is supposed to
increase his o￿er (st = 1):
(c) If (a) does not apply and Xt￿1 ￿ z(m+1), then either st￿1 = 1 and
then st = 0, or st￿1 = 0 and then st = 1. That is, player i is supposed to
increase his o￿er at t only if player j were supposed to increase her o￿er at
t ￿ 1, but not otherwise.
Rule (a) implies that whoever is drawn to start a phase is supposed to
increase his o￿er. Rule (b) implies that when a player (say player j) is the
￿rst to make a generous move down to or below some threshold z(m+1), it
15is the other player (player i) who is expected to make a move to the next
threshold z(m). Rule (c) implies that as long as this generous move does not
come and Xt remains in the interval (z(m) +d;z(m+1)], player j is supposed
to wait for player i to make the generous move (down to z(m)).
To conclude the description of the strategies, we specify what players do
in the event Xt ￿ z(0). The player who moves (i.e. player i) chooses an o￿er
(yt
i;yt
j) = (Xt
i +
Xt
2
+
z(0)
2
;Xt
j +
Xt
2
￿
z(0)
2
); (13)
This o￿er, as well as any o￿er that would be more generous, is accepted.
Any o￿er that is less generous than yi is rejected by player j.
We have:
Proposition: The strategy pro￿le ￿ de￿ned above is a subgame perfect
Nash equilibrium. Each player’s equilibrium payo￿ is no larger than 2c(1￿
￿)k where k is the largest integer such that z(k) < 1.
The proof the Proposition appears in Appendix. As already noted, for
a ￿xed value of ￿, there are e￿ciency losses, even at the limit when the
cost of breakdown becomes arbitrarily small. This is to be contrasted with
the analysis of Compte and Jehiel (2004) in which when the e￿ciency loss
induced by the outside option is su￿ciently small, there are no ine￿ciencies
in equilibrium: parties must opt out in equilibrium.
This may seem contradictory, as in our set up, when the cost of break-
down vanishes, the cost associated with triggering the outside option (i.e.
forcing a breakdown) vanishes too. However, unlike in Compte and Jehiel
(2004), it cannot be that in equilibrium, parties ￿nd it optimal to opt out
(and force a breakdown). Because if it were the case, then this would imply
that no agreement would ever be found (because in the next phase, par-
ties would still ￿nd it optimal to force breakdown and so on). This simple
argument explains why forcing a breakdown serves only as a threat in the
present model and can never be used in equilibrium no matter how small
the cost of moving to a new bargaining phase is.
165 Discussion
We wish to discuss here possible extensions of our model. We have assumed
that reference points coincide with the most generous o￿er received so far.
A more general speci￿cation would allow the reference point to react to a
lesser extent to prior o￿ers. For example,
r
(n+1)
j ￿ r
(n)
j = ￿maxfX
(n)
j ￿ r
(n)
j ;0g; (14)
where ￿ 2 (0;1) would measure the sensitivity of the reference point to prior
o￿ers.
We have also assumed that preferences are solely driven by the compar-
ison of partition o￿ers to reference points. As noted by K￿ oszegi and Rabin
(2006) a more general speci￿cation would allow both the absolute payo￿ and
the relative payo￿ to enter the utility speci￿cation. For example, denoting
by ri player i’s reference point, player i’s utility associated with the partition
o￿er y = (yi;yj) may take the form:
vi(y;ri) = (1 ￿ ￿)yi + ￿(yi ￿ ri) (15)
where ￿ 2 (0;1) captures the weight the agent puts on the reference-
dependent part of his utility. Observe that vi(y;ri) = yi ￿ ￿ri and thus
this is formally similar to a situation in which preferences are as speci￿ed
in Section 2 with a reference point de￿ned as a fraction ￿ of ri. Assuming
ri evolves as in Section 2, this is thus equivalent to the situation in which
reference points evolve as in (14) with ￿ = ￿.14
The analysis of equilibrium is more complicated in these extensions be-
cause the state of the game can no longer be solely described by the most
generous o￿ers made so far as it should distinguish between o￿ers made in
the current phase and o￿ers made in earlier phases. However the qualitative
14If reference points do not react that strongly to prior o￿ers then this will correspond
to a smaller ￿.
17insights developed in Section 3 remain unchanged. To ￿x ideas, if the step
by which o￿ers are increased is constant throughout the game then the step
size ￿ should satisfy
￿ ￿ 2c(2 ￿ ￿)=￿
when reference points evolve according to (14). Thus, bargaining will be
gradual, there will be ine￿ciencies even in the limit as c gets small, and these
ine￿ciencies will be more important as reference points are more sensitive
to prior o￿ers (￿ is larger). The e￿ect of more sensitivity is that it increases
the payo￿ a party can guarantee by forcing a breakdown, thereby making
this threat more stringent and the resulting delay larger.
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20Appendix (Proof of the Proposition)
Fix Xt
1 and Xt
2. Assume that z(m) < Xt ￿ z(m+1), player i is supposed
to move, and make a more generous o￿er (st = 1). We let vm+1(Xt) denote
the expected payo￿ in excess of Xt
j ￿ rt
j that player j gets under ￿, and by
vm+1 the expected payo￿ in excess of Xt
i ￿ rt
i that player i gets under ￿.15
We also let ￿ vm+1 = vm+1(z(m+1)). These values are de￿ned by induction on
m.
When m = 0, player i makes an o￿er that is accepted, so we have:
v1 = z(0);
v1(X) = X ￿ z(0);
￿ v1 = z(1) ￿ z(0)
When m > 0, player i makes an o￿er that is rejected. With probability
(1￿￿), there is no breakdown and player j is the next mover (and makes a
more generous o￿er). With probability ￿, there is breakdown, in which case
each player has equal chance of being the ￿rst mover. This implies:
vm+1 = (1 ￿ ￿)￿ vm + ￿[
￿ vm + vm
2
￿ c], and (16)
vm+1(X) = X ￿ z(m￿1) + (1 ￿ ￿)vm + ￿[
￿ vm + vm
2
￿ c] (17)
Note that the thresholds have been chosen precisely to ensure that for all
15v
(m+1) is independent of X
t because, whatever X
t, player i is supposed to reach the
threshold z
(m):
21m ￿ 1;16
￿ vm ￿ vm = 2c; (18)
or equivalently
￿ vm + vm
2
￿ c = vm:
This equality is key to check incentives. It ensures that at Xt = z(m+1)
with st = 1 (i.e. player i is supposed to make a more generous o￿er), player
i is indi￿erent between making that o￿er (and obtaining vm+1), and waiting
for breakdown, in which case he gets
￿ vm+1+vm+1
2 ￿ c.
Before proceeding to check all possible deviations, it is worth noting that
these equalities imply:
vm+1(X) ￿ vm+1 = X ￿ z(m) + (1 ￿ ￿)2c: (19)
and that vm+1 = vm + (1 ￿ ￿)2c.
Let us now check for all possible one-shot deviations. We call yi;m the
equilibrium o￿er that i is supposed to make.
If player i chooses a less generous o￿er yt leading to Xt+1 2 (z(m) +
￿;Xt]. In case of breakdown, he obtains
vm+1 + vm+1(Xt+1)
2
￿ c
which by construction is smaller than vm+1. In case no breakdown occurs,
player j does not change her o￿er (st+1 = 0), and player i is still supposed
to o￿er yi;m, and thus obtains vm+1. So the deviation is not pro￿table.
If player i chooses an o￿er yt (less generous than yi;m) leading to Xt+1 2
(z(m);z(m) + ￿), then st+1 = 1 (rule (a)). If no breakdown occurs, player
16To see why (18) holds, observe that for m = 1, ￿ v
1 ￿v
1 = z
(1) ￿2z
(0) = 2c: For m > 1,
this is checked by induction on m; as equalities (16) and (17) imply:
￿ v
m+1 ￿ v
m+1 = z
(m) ￿ z
(m￿1) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(￿ v
m ￿ v
m) = 2c(2 ￿ ￿) ￿ 2c(1 ￿ ￿) = 2c:
22j moves and player i gets vm+1(X). Otherwise player i pays c, and either
player i is called upon moving again, and he gets vm+1 or player j moves
and he gets vm+1(Xt+1). So his expected gain is
(1 ￿ ￿=2)vm+1(Xt+1) + ￿=2vm+1 ￿ ￿c
which we need to compare to vm+1. Since Xt+1 < z(m) + ￿, by (19), this
expression is strictly smaller than
vm+1 + (1 ￿ ￿=2)[￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)2c)] ￿ ￿c
hence, given the de￿nition of ￿, strictly smaller than vm+1. So the deviation
is not pro￿table.
Finally, it is easy to check that o￿ers that are more generous than yi;m
cannot be pro￿table deviations either.
To conclude we need to check incentives when Xt ￿ z(0). Recall that
the equilibrium o￿er is given by (13). If a more generous o￿er is made, it
is accepted, so it cannot be pro￿table. If a less generous o￿er is made, it
is rejected. Either there is breakdown, and player i obtains (in excess to
X
(t)
i ￿ rt
i) Xt=2 ￿ c. Or there is no breakdown, and he gets Xt=2 ￿ z(0)=2.
So in expectation, player i obtains
(1 ￿ ￿)(Xt=2 ￿ z(0)=2) + ￿(Xt=2 ￿ c) < Xt=2
Now player j has incentives to reject a less generous o￿er, say yt
j < Xt
j +
Xt=2 ￿ z(0)=2, because if she does, she obtains (in excess to X
(t)
j ￿ rt
j)
(1￿￿)(Xt=2+z(0)=2)+￿(Xt=2￿c) = Xt=2+(1￿￿)
z(0)
2
￿(1￿￿=2)z(0) = Xt=2￿
z(0)
2
.
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